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INTRODUCTION

In the preface to The Immoralist, Andr6 Gide defends his
failure to pass judgment on the hero of his novel: "I do not
indeed claim that neutrality (I was going to say 'indecision') is the
certain mark of a great mind; but I believe that many great
minds have been very loath to . . . conclude-and that to state a
problem clearly is not to suppose it solved in advance."1 If this is
the test of intellectual greatness, many of those writing in the
commercial law field have passed with flying colors. In the
complex world of law and economics, of formulas and regression
analyses, it is far easier to convey one's confusions than to assert
definite legal and policy conclusions. Alas, however, I must join
the ranks of the lesser minds; for this essay is anything but
neutral. To the question whether private repossession under the
Uniform Commercial Code violates the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, I answer decidedly in the affirmative-2
In recent Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions,
the judiciary, to paraphrase the description of one
commentator, 3 has run wild by legislating out of existence various prejudgment remedies-garnishment, cognovit notes,
replevin and other similar devices available to creditors. The
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin. B.A. 1965, J.D. 1968,
University of Pennsylvania. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
1 A. GIDE, THE IMMORALIST vii-viii (1962).
2 A number of other authors maintain the opposite position. See, e.g., Burke &
Reber, State Action, CongressionalPower and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth
Amendment, 47 S. CAl.. L. REv. 1 (1973); Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession Under the
s. & MARY L. REv.
Uniform Cmnmercial Code: A Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14 Wm
767 (1973); White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973
Wis. L. REv. 503 (1973). On the other hand, Professors Clark and Landers share my
conclusion, see Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the
59 VA. L. REV. 355 (1973).
Constitution,
3
See Silberfield, Legislative and JudicialDevelopments in 1972, 89 BANKING L.J. 1059,
1077 (1972).
4 See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Aaron v. Clark, 342 F.
Supp. 898 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972),
rev'd sub nom. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1974);
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constitutional defect in each of these cases was the failure of the
state to provide notice and the opportunity for a hearing before
a neutral official prior to the seizure of the debtor's property.
Most involved consumer transactions where the bargaining
power of the debtor was slight, and therefore the creditor's
assertion of contractual waiver of the constitutional right to
notice and hearing by the debtor was viewed as insubstantial.
The next round of the debate over prejudgment remedies,5
which has received extensive attention among commentators
and lower federal courts, 6 is whether private repossession should
also be declared unconstitutional. The relevant portion of the
Uniform Commercial Code is section 9-503: "Unless otherwise
agreed, a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may
proceed without judicial process if this can be done without
breach of the peace or may proceed by action... ." Of the many
courts that have addressed this issue, only a few have responded
affirmatively. 7 A majority of the commentators seem similarly
Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Klim v. Jones,
315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Superior Ct., 5 Cal.
3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972); Jones
Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970); cases
cited note 7 infra. But see, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir.
1970); Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); cases cited note 7
infra. See generally Clark & Landers, supra note 2; Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the
Bill Collector, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 521 (1973).
'See, e.g., Burke & Reber, supra note 2; Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and
Deficiency: A Journey to the Underworld and a Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. REV. 302 (1972);
Clark & Landers, supra note 2; Countryman, supra note 4; Dauer & Gilhool, The Economics
of Constitutionalized Repossession: A Critique for Professor Johnson, and a PartialReply, 47 S.
CAL. L REV. 116 (1973); Dunham, Due Process and Commercial Law, 1972 Sup. CT. REV.
135; Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession:An Economic Analysis, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 82
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession]; Johnson, A Response
to Dauer and Gilhool: A Defense of Self-Help Repossession, id. 151 [hereinafter cited as
Johnson, A Response]; Martin, Secured Transactions, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 593 (1973); McCall,
The Past as Prologue: A History of the Right to Repossess, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 58 (1973);
Mentschikoff, supra note 2; Neth, Repossession of Consumer Goods: Due Process for the
Consumer, What's Due for the Creditor, 24 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 7 (1972); White, supra note
2; Comment, 50 DE,,.. L.J. 261 (1973).
6See cases cited note 7 infra.
7 Holding § 9-503 unconstitutional, e.g.: Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co.,
Civil No. 72-3299-G (D. Mass., Aug. 15, 1973), summarized at 42 U.S.L.W. 2116 (1973);
Michel v. Rex-Noreco, Inc., 12 UCC REi'. SERV. 543 (D. Vt. 1972); Gibbs v. Titelman, 4
CCH SEC. TR. GUIDE 52,241 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.
Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2"d 324 (9th Cir.,
1974); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Dinitz, 11 UCC REP. SERV. 627 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972); cases
cited in Burke & Reber, supra note 2, at 8 n.490.
Holding § 9-503 constitutional, e.g.: Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492
F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1974); Mayhugh v. Bill Allen Chevrolet, 4 CCH SEC. TR. GuIDE
52, 251 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Kinch v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 4 CCH SEC. TR. GUIDE
52,248 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Turner v. Impala Motors, Civil No. C-73-50 (W.D. Tenn.,
June 15, 1973); Shirley v. State Natl Bank, Civil No. 15,319 (D. Conn., Apr. 2, 1973);
Colvin v. Avco Fin'l Servs., Inc., 12 UCC REP. SERV. 25 (D. Utah 1973); Kirksey v.
Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp.
118 (D. Neb. 1972); Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972);
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disposed,8 and with a fragile 4-3 majority in Fuentes v. Shevin,9
the leading Supreme Court case, these commentators may well
turn out to be excellent prognosticators. But the arguments to
the contrary are weighty, and this Article is devoted to their
presentation.
II. BACKGROUND
The recent attack on prejudgment remedies began in 1966,
nearly 100 years after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, when Christine Sniadach decided that she could not live
on only half of her sixty dollar per week salary. The Family
Finance Company had instituted a garnishment action against
Ms. Sniadach and her employer, seeking to garnish one half of
her wages in order to satisfy a promissory note for $420 which
she had signed. Ms. Sniadach responded with the argument that
the garnishment of her wages, without prior notice and judicial
hearing, violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Ms. Sniadach lost at the hands of an unresponsive
Wisconsin Supreme Court,"' but she received a considerably
more hospitable reception from the United States Supreme
Court. By a near unanimous vote, the Court declared the Wisconsin garnishment procedure unconstitutional. 1 In the words
of Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for seven members of the Court:
A prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type
is a taking which may impose tremendous hardship on
wage earners with families to support ...
The leverage of the creditor on the wage earner is
enormous ...
The result is' that a prejudgment garnishment of
the Wisconsin type may as a practical matter drive a
McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Northside Motors, Inc.
v. Brinkley, 4 CCH SEC. TR. GUIDE 52,185 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1973); Brown v. United States
Nail Bank, 96 Ore. Adv. Sheets 1667, 509 P.2d 442 (1973); Giglio v. Bank of Del., 12
UCC REP. SERV. 934 (Del. Ch. 1973); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 4 CCH SEc. TR.
GUIDE
51,952 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1972); Yankwitt v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 12 UCC REP'.
SERV. 1254 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1973); cases cited in Burke & Reber, supra note 2, at 8 nA90.
8 Of the commentators cited in note 5 supra, Professors Clark and Landers, Professors Dauer and Gilhool and Professor Countryman conclude that § 9-503 is unconstitutional.
9407 U.S. 67 (1972). The Supreme Court has heard oral argument in Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 263 La. 627, 269 So.2d 186 (1972), cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 2276 (1973),
which involves issues almost identical to those in Fuentes. See 42 U.S.L.W. 3345 (1973).
This case should settle the controversy over the vitality of Fuentes.
to Family Finance Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1967).
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). For discussion of Sniadach,
see, e.g., Clark & Landers, supra note 2; Countryman, supra note 4; Kennedy, Due Process
Limitations on Creditors' Remedies: Some Reflections on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 19
Am. U.L. REv. 158 (1970).
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wage-earning family to the wall. Where the taking of
one's property is so obvious, it needs no extended
argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior
hearing . . . this prejudgment garnishment procedure
violates the fundamental principles of due process. 2
Mr. Justice Harlan, responding both to the majority and to Mr.
Justice Black's dissent, concurred with characteristic eloquence:
[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits state action by norms of "fundamental fairness" whose content in any given instance is to be
judicially derived not alone.., from the specifics of the
Constitution, but also ... from concepts which are part
of the Anglo-American legal heritage ....
...
Apart from special situations, .... I think that
due process is afforded only by the kinds of "notice"
and "hearing" which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity of the underlying
claim against the alleged debtor before he can 13be deprived of his property or its unrestricted use.
Sniadach proved to be a law professor's delight, a source of
endless discussion and confusion both to the practicing bar and
to law students. For while that decision's applicability to garnishment laws in most states was obvious, the scope of the
opinion remained obscure. Was the decision applicable to wage
assignments, which accoinplished largely the same objective as
wage garnishment but which involved, at least arguably, some
additional measure of debtor consent? Both Justices Douglas and
Harlan noted that summary procedures were appropriate in
some largely unspecified emergency circumstances. What were
these circumstances? Was garnishment permissible for jurisdictional purposes? In order to prevent the debtor from fleeing the
jurisdiction with the wages? Was Sniadach applicable to other
types of prejudgment remedies? Cognovit notes? Replevin actions? Private repossessions? Seizures of all goods? Or were
wages somehow special because necessary to the very survival of
the family? If Sniadach were applicable to the retaking of goods,
what constituted an emergency which would justify summary
procedures under those circumstances? A threat of destruction
or removal of the collateral? Most importantly, what constituted
an adequate prior hearing? Did the decision require, as Mr.
Justice Harlan suggested, simply an opportunity to demonstrate
12

395 U.S. at 340-42 (footnote omitted).

13

Id. at 342-43.
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that the asserted claim was colorable or probable, or did it
require a full-scale judicial hearing on the merits? In what
fashion, if any, might a debtor waive his constitutional right to
notice and hearing? As might be suspected, the lower federal
courts differed sharply in their approaches to these post-Sniadach
14
problems.
In 1972, after a three year hiatus, the Supreme Court
addressed itself to many of these issues. In Fuentes v. Shevin,' 5 it
declared unconstitutional replevin statutes in Florida' 6 and
Pennsylvania' 7 which allowed the seizure of goods without notice
or hearing. In so doing, the Court expressly or by implication
settled a number of critical issues. First, Sniadach was not applicable only to wages or to some extraordinarily yital classes of
property. Fuentes involved the seizure of a stove, a stereo, a table,
a bed and other similar items, and the Court expressly held that
the fourteenth amendment was applicable to property generally
and not only to so-called "necessities of life.""' The Court, quite
appropriately I think, eschewed reliance on so subjective a standard.
Second, the Court attempted to define in the narrowest of
terms those emergency circumstances which would allow summary procedures. The Court opined that such circumstances
must be "truly unusual" and strongly hinted that "private gain,"
in contrast to the fulfillment of some significant governmental
interest, would never suffice.' 9 Third, Mr. Justice Stewart who
wrote for the four man majority-Justices Rehnquist and Powell
did not participate-stated that due process was applicable to
even temporary deprivations of property; for under the Florida
and Pennsylvania replevin statutes, the debtor could recover his
property within three days of the seizure if he posted a bond for
double the value of the goods seized. 20 So long as the deprivation
was not de minimis, notice and hearing were required, although
the weight of the property interest was relevant to the form of
notice and hearing that would be required.2 ' Fourth, without

"4

See, e.g., Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Black
Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); First Nat'I Bank & Trust
Co. v. Pomona Mach. Co., 107 Ariz. 286, 486 P.2d 184 (1971).
15 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
16 Act of May 30, 1955, ch. 29,706, § 1, 1955 Fla. Laws 195 (repealed 1973); Act of
Mar. 10, 1845, §§ 4, 6, 7 (repealed 1973); Act of Feb. 2, 1861, ch. 1099, § 1 (repealed
1973).
17 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1821 (1967); PA. R. Cxv. P. 1037(a), 1073, 1076, 1077

(1967).
18 407 U.S. at 88-90.
19 Id. at 90-92. But cf. id. at 93.
20
1Id. at 80-84.
" Id. at 90 n.21.
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specifying coherent limits, the Court held that the nature of the2
2
prior hearing was largely a matter of legislative discretion.
Fifth, the majority largely avoided the question of waiver of due
process rights by noting that the.purported waiver in Fuentes did
not clearly
indicate that summary procedures
were
contemplated.23 However, the Court reviewed with favor its
earlier decision in D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick,2 4 which required
that a due process waiver be "voluntarily, intelligently, and
knowingly" made, 25 and intimated strongly that this would rarely
be the case in consumer transactions, where the inequality of
bargaining power between the parties is legendary.
At the risk of oversimplification, the Fuentes decision appears
to portend a revolution in creditor-debtor relations, a revolution
which the Supreme Court is overseeing but not explaining. I say
this for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has adopted a
rather intriguing definition of the property interest sufficient to
trigger due process guarantees. In Sniadach, as in the typical
eminent domain proceeding, there was no doubt as to who
owned the property in question. The wages belonged to Ms.
Sniadach who had earned them, and the dispute was over
whether the creditor could claim those wages, without judicial
approval, to satisfy another obligation. In a sense, the creditor
was no more entitled to those wages than a merchant would be
entitled to seize $500 from a table top while attending a cocktail
party given by his debtor. Or to put the matter in a different
light, no more than an automobile purchaser is entitled to return
his "lemon" and seize another car from his dealer's lot. In these
cases, there is no conflict as to who owns the property in
question, and it seems quite reasonable to require some judicial
supervision, by way of notice and hearing, before the debtor is
deprived of his property to satisfy a debt which he may contest.
The situation in Fuentes was quite different. One may very well
agree with the proposition that a person should not be deprived
of his property without due process of law, but whose property
was the stereo and the stove and the bed? Were they not as much
the creditor's property as the debtor's property? What if the
debtor had not made a single payment? I do not mean to
resurrect the old notion, rejected by the Uniform Commercial
Code, that abstract concepts of the passage of title should conI,

2d.
at 96-97. Cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), which was dted in Fueytes
with approval, 407 U.S. at 85 n.15.
23 407 U.S. at 94-96.
24 405 U.S. 174 (1972). But see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS O1 LAW (1973).
"5Id. at 187.
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trol. But how does one determine which party's expectations
concerning his property are entitled to prejudgment protection?
Professor Martin has put the matter this way:
It should be obvious that when the [debtor's] possession is guaranteed, possession is denied to the secured
party. Why is possession guaranteed to one party but
not to another? Essentially because at the time that the
replevin process is invoked, one party is in possession
and one is not, so that only one party can be "deprived"
of his property in the active sense of that word. In this
light, the Fuentes use of due process appears not so
much a protection of the individual's property rights
against
the state . . as mere preservation of the status
26
quo.
I would suggest, perhaps differing only in emphasis, the Supreme Court is moving us away from the most traditional notions of property, notions that speak not only to the physical
possession of the property but also to the rightness or legality of
that possession. In effect, the Court has given support to a
definition of property under which a mere possessor of property
has an interest entitled to fourteenth amendment protections,2 7
despite encumbrances on that property and the claims of creditors. Possession has indeed become nine-tenths of the law.
This development is startling, but not completely inconsistent with our legal traditions. In tort law, it has been long
recognized that the possessory interest must temporarily prevail
in disputed property claim cases until there is some judicial
resolution.2 8 Any other rule would allow the more powerful
claimant to seize the property, with the attendant possibilities of
violence and interference with privacy. More fundamentally,
however, the possessory notion of property may be an articulation of a fundamental change in modern societal attitudes and
expectations. With the rise of the mass consumer market, and
the concomitant extension of credit on a massive scale, 2 9 a large
proportion of real and personal property is sold on credit. While
in the early days of the mass consumer market, debtor26 Martin, supra note 5, at 633. A similar analysis would be applicable to Sniadach if a
wage assignment, not garnishment, were involved there. The artificiality of the distinc-

tion 27
lends further support to the Fuentes decision.

Cf O'Neil, OfJusticeDelayed andJusticeDenied: The Welfare PriorHearingCases, 1970

Sup. CT. Rnv. 161, 169.
s See W. PROSSER,
9

HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 22 (4th ed. 1971).
See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN

THE UNITED STArES 5-21 (1972).
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consumers may have felt that their enjoyment of the property
was due to the largesse of the creditor, the multiplication of
credit transactions and the inherent human need to possess and
own and to exercise exclusive control over the immediate home
environment-the castle, if you please-has generated expectations of the continued enjoyment of encumbered property. A
debtor will say it is "his" house although it is subject to a ninety
percent mortgage, just as he will say that it is "his" color television or refrigerator although he has signed a conditional sales
contract and has not made a single payment. The proposition
that a family does not own anything is too damaging psychologically to countenance, too indicative of rootlessness, too evident of
the lack of economic success and too alienative. In Fuentes, the
Court did no more than affirm these widespread expectations.
The creditor, of course, is the victim of this change in societal
and legal attitudes toward property.
The second implication of Fuentes builds on the first. This is
the suggestion that the power to authorize nonconsensual
changes in the status quo with respect to property, that is, to
allow the use of physical force against the debtor or the forceful
removal of "his" property without his consent, has been shifted
away from the private sector to- the public sector. Indeed, while
there is no suggestion to this effect in Fuentes, it may be appropriate to assert that only the state can carry out such involuntary
transfers of property, that private parties may not enforce such
sanctions, even if they have been authorized by the courts.
The obvious rejoinder to this second line of argument takes
the following form: While it is true under the facts and circumstances of Fuentes that notice and a hearing were required before
the property could be seized, and that as a consequence, the
power to effect a change in the status quo was placed in the
courts, this was so only because there was state action involved in
the case. The power to authorize seizure was never in the hands
of creditors since resort to governmental authority, however pro
forma, was always required, and repossession was consummated
through government agents. Thus, the argument runs, procedural due process is required only when the government itself
is involved in the seizure of goods and not when repossession is
undertaken pursuant to a private agreement. For it is not so
much that power has been taken from private creditors as that
any significant governmental intrusion into the process requires
adherence to standards of fairness. Fuentes left private reposses-
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sions untouched; and they are entirely permissible, subject to the
limitation contained in the Uniform Commercial Code with
respect to avoiding breaches of the peace.3"
III.

STATE ACTION

Under this restrictive view of Fuentes, due process protections should be extended to private repossessions under the
Uniform Commercial Code only if the requisite degree of state
action can be found. I must confess a degree of ambivalence
concerning such an inquiry. On the one hand, whether the
Court is concerned with nonconsensual physical interference
with possessory interests in property or with more limited notions of governmental fairness, the result in a case testing the
constitutionality of private repossession is likely to be articulated,
at least in part, in state action terms. The choice of the state
action framework, though it does not necessarily dictate a particular underlying theory for invalidating private repossession, is
compelled by the traditional view of the fourteenth amendment.
On the other hand, the subject of state action is sufficiently
murky, the Court's position in any given case sufficiently unpredictable, and the arguments so wholly formalistic and disfunctional, that I fear that a blind emphasis on state action will
obfuscate the basic policy considerations. 3 1
If the traditional analysis is to be pursued, the Court could
easily find state action in that section 9-503 encourages private
repossessions, 3 2 or that it involves private parties in a public
function, 3 3 or that legal recognition of private repossessions (e.g.,
the state's clearing of title to repossessed vehicles) ultimately
entwines the state in the repossession. 34 These issues have been

debated by the courts 35 and commentators. 36 But the results are

30 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503; see Dunham, supra note 5, at 138; White,
supra note 2, at 504-08. See also Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'I Bank, No. 72-1484
(9th Cir., Oct. 4, 1973).
31See, e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal. Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1974).
82 See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
31See Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 439
(5th Cir. 1970). But see, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
33 ' See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Compare, e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
1974) with id. at 338 (Byrne, J., dissenting). See generally cases cited note 7 supra.
36
See, e.g., Burke & Reber, supra note 5, at 12-23 (no state action); Clark, supra note
5, at 329-30 (state action); Clark & Landers, supra note 2, at 377-383 (state action);
Martin, supra note 5, at 638-41 (state action "dubious"); Neth, supra note 5, at 48-63 (no
state action); White, supra note 2, at 504-08 (no state action); Comment, supra note 5
(state action). See also McCall, supra note 5.
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inconclusive; the authorities are divided. Indeed, Professor
Neth, who has given these issues the most careful analysis,
concludes: "While not convincing to me, there is enough in the
arguments .

.

. to permit a Supreme Court so inclined to find

37
state action in self-help repossession.
The real inquiry, then, is whether it is wise as a matter of
public policy to extend Fuentes to private repossessions' and this
essentially involves two questions: Are the additional costs of
notice and a hearing outweighed by the economic and other
benefits to be derived from them? And are there compelling
policy reasons for placing the remedy of repossession in the
exclusive domain of the state?
With the notable exception of Professor Dunham, 38 practicing lawyers and scholars have largely limited themselves to the
first question, and I will do no more than suggest the difficulties
with both the evidence and the weighing process involved in
cost-benefit analysis. The second question framed by the discussion of Fuentes above has received little attention elsewhere, and
thus merits a somewhat more detailed treatment. My conclusion
is that the state, in an age of mass consumption and consumer
credit, should maintain a monopoly over nonconsensual physical
interference with the possessory interests of debtors in their
property. In fact and in law, neither the power to authorize nor
the power to carry out the repossession sanction should be
delegable to private parties. This principle, while analogous to
the state function theory of state action, is premised more on
what due process should affirmatively require of the state than
on the safeguards which must be imposed on private parties
when they begin to act like the state.3 a It finds its roots in the
necessities of modern policy and not in a simple overview of
historical experience. Moreover, the principle does not extend to
all unilateral sanctions by a nondefaulting party under a bilateral
contract (e.g., acceleration or refusal to convey goods), but only
to those which result in the termination of "an existing posses'40
sion and continuous enjoyment.

IV.

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

Perhaps the most thoughtful discussion of the -competing
economic interests involved in private repossessions appears in a
3378

Neth, supra note 5, at 62.
Dunham, supra note 5.
a See generally Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword, Toward a Model of Roles
in the0 Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1973).
4 Dunham, supra note 5, at 153.
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recent article by Professor James White.4 ' Professor White undertakes a detailed analysis of the costs and benefits to be
derived from a requirement of notice and hearing before private
seizure of collateral from a debtor. On the cost side, he reaches
the following conclusions:
1. Private repossessions of household goods such as refrigerators and washing machines are relatively rare because of
the necessity to enter the house and the likelihood that a breach
of the peace may result in violation of section 9-503. Private
repossessions of automobiles, including both instances of voluntary debtor relinquishment and creditor self-help, are quite
common; approximately 960,000 automobiles, representing
roughly four percent of all outstanding automobile contracts, are
repossessed nationally each year.42
2. Given the fact that the average repossession is preceded
by thirty or more contacts, 43 often threatening repossession, the
likelihood that a debtor will skip with the automobile simply
because a judicial hearing is required is slight. On this basis, the
proportion of "skips" likely under private repossession or judicial
44
repossession would appear to be the same.
3. The per transaction costs of judicial repossession are
considerably greater than those of private repossession. Based on
41 The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 Wis. L. REv.
503. Professor White's study represents a refinement of earlier work by Professor Robert
W. Johnson of the Krannert School of Industrial Administration, Purdue University,
which appears in Brief for Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code as Amicus Curiae, Appendix, Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, - F.2d (9th Cir. 1973). Professor Johnson's conclusions as to the costs of notice and hearing
requirements are higher than are Professor White's. Professor Johnson's analysis was
subsequently published, Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession, supra note 5. That
published version conflicts in some respects with Professor White's report of Professor
Johnson's earlier version. For example, opportunity costs, see text accompanying note 46
infra, in Professor White's earlier report amount to $24 for new cars repossessed and $8
for used cars, but in the Southern CaliforniaLaw Review version, Professor Johnson lists
these costs as $13 and $8 respectively. Similar adUustments were apparently made in
depreciation cost computations. Compare Johnson, Denial of Self-Helfi Repossession, supra
note 5, at 106, with White, supra note 2, at 516. The figures discussed herein are those
accepted by Professor White.
Professor Johnson's published version has been critically examined in Dauer &
Gilhool, supra note 5. Professor Johnson's rebuttal to this criticism is available as well, see
Jghnson, A Response, supra note 5.
For a conclusion that "there is no need for the credit market to be unduly concerned
with the possible effects of Fuentes and Adams [given the constitutional preclusion of
prejudgment self-help repossession]," see Krahmer, Clifford & Lasley, Fuentes v. Shevin:
Due Process and the Consumer, A Legal and Empirical Study, 4 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 23, 62
(1972).
42 White, supra note 2, at 513-14.
43 These include telephone calls, delinquency notices, and personal contacts. Some of
these contacts represent communications regarding prior delinquencies, however, not the
delinquency that finally precipitates repossession. Id. 515 n.43 (citing Johnson, Denial of
Self-Help Repossession, supra note 5).
44 Id. 514-15.
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current experience regarding the frequency of debtor relinquishments before creditor self-help is required,45 Professor
White estimates that three in five debtors will surrender their
automobiles before a hearing takes place. He assumes, however,
that none of these voluntary relinquishments will occur prior to
the creditor's instituting judicial repossession proceedings. The
costs of instituting these proceedings is estimated as $128 for an
average new car and $92 for an average used car. These figures
represent two costs not present in private repossessions: legal
fees (including court costs) and the losses occasioned by an
estimated thirty-day delay in repossessing automobiles. Professor
White reasons that if complaints of half the creditors are handled on a production lithe basis, the lawyer's fee should average
out to $60 or so for each case, including the costs of filing and
service. With respect to the delay, he estimates that the average
new car will depreciate $48 and the average used car $26 during
the thirty-day delay, and that opportunity costs will be incurred
of $15 and $8 respectively. By opportunity costs Professor White
refers to the dealer's inability to invest the resale value of the
repossessed car until after the expiration of the thirty-day
period.4 6
For the roughly two in five debtors who refuse to surrender
their automobiles prior to the judicial hearing, Professor White
adds $125, over and above the cost of self-help, to the cost of
each repossession.4 7 This represents the estimated costs of proof
in default cases. 48 Totalling the costs of instituting judicial repossession proceedings 4 9 for all cases and of proving the two in five
default cases, Professor White concludes that the cost of replacing self-help repossession with judicial repossession would be
50
approximately $143 million per year.
4. It is unclear whether the creditor will be able to pass on
the additional costs of judicial repossession to the debtor or
whether he will be compelled to absorb those costs. The assump45 See Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession, supra note 5, at 108.

White, supra note 2, at 515-20.
47 Costs of trying contqsted cases are not included because those costs would
46

presumably be encountered in a defensive action following a self-help repossession. See
Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession, supra note 5, at 99-100.
48 See note 47 supra. At one point Professor White questions this amount as being too

high, because it assumes that a court appearance will be required even in default cases,
that is, that the creditor cannot take his default on the basis of an affidavit. White, supra
note 2, at 520. Nevertheless, Professor White does not discount the $125 figure in his
computations. Id. 521 n.54.
49 Adjustment is also made to account for the difference between opportunity costs
in repossessions of new and used cars. Id. 521 n.54.
"Id.

520-22.
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tion, however, is that the creditor, "by hook or by crook," will
find some way to maintain his profit margin. This may take the
form of charging higher interest rates or higher prices for
goods, excluding high risk debtors from the credit market, or
5
some combination of these alternatives. '
Against these costs, Professor White argues that there are
very few benefits which attend judicial repossession. Most debtors are actually in default and have more than ample notice that
this is the case. The problem of overzealous creditors repossessing goods upon which there is no default is not serious
-particularly in the light of the economic costs imposed on
creditors by repossession. A related question is how many
debtors have valid defenses which they might assert against the
creditor. The raising of such defenses may be precluded by the
terms of the contract or the holder in due course doctrine, but
Professor White does not rest his case on these grounds. Rather,
he asserts that instances of such bona fide defenses will be
relatively rare. He admits, however, that there is no substantial
body of data to support this conclusion. Finally, he asserts that
most repossession hearings would be a charade. Even debtors
with valid defenses will not appear, because they are ignorant of
their rights, fearful of the judicial system, or unable to afford
52
legal counsel.
Balancing these costs and benefits, Professor White concludes that Fuentes should not be extended to private repossessions under section 9-503:
When one has put all the data on the scale and
made his best guesses about facts unknown, how does
the due process scale tip? Does it call for the elimination
of self-help repossession? . . . [N]o 'one can seriously
dispute that the removal of self-help repossession will
substantially increase car lenders' costs. ...
What are the benefits to the individual? Surely
some debtors who now lose their cars to repossessors
will present defenses and save their cars under a prehearing system. . . [But] my guess is that only a
handful in a thousand would benefit. . . . Are a few
thousand cars worth $143 million? I conclude not. .... 53
He distinguishes Fuentes on two cost-benefit grounds: first, the
increment in legal costs is not as great in replevin cases since the
creditor must file his action in court anyway; and second, re51 Id. 522-24.
21d. 527-29.
531Id. 529-30.
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plevin is often used to repossess household goods which will
deteriorate in value only marginally during the thirty-day delay
54
period necessitated by the hearing and notice requirement.
Taken on its own assumption that only economic costs are to
be weighed, the balance drawn by Professor White is very much
open to question. The most significant flaw is his underestimation of the adaptability of creditors and their lawyers, and state
legislatures. To begin with, in the light of the 3 in 5 cases in
which the debtor voluntarily surrenders his automobile before
the creditor takes self-help action under the current system, it
seems likely that the costs of even initiating judicial repossession
will be avoided entirely in many cases.5 5 In the cases where the
judicial process is invoked, it seems likely, as Professor White
assumes, that form complaints will be prepared on a production
line basis requiring very little of a lawyer's time. But while he
computes that the costs of initiating judicial repossession proceedings could be trimmed in this way to about $10, Professor
White assumes that half the cases will continue to be "handled in
6
a more conventional fashion at $75 to $100 per complaint.""5
It

seems more reasonable to expect that if costs might be cut so
dramatically, a larger percentage of creditors will find it possible
to take advantage of streamlined arrangements. Additionally, the
legislature might well decide to lower the normal filing feesparticularly if, as Professor White notes, most debtors will not
choose to take advantage of their opportunity for a hearing
anyway. With respect to delay and the concomitant opportunity
and depreciation .costs: if the filing process is made simpler and
cheaper, a creditor can minimize these costs by serving a notice
of hearing and a copy of the complaint early in his series of
dunning letters and other contacts. While this might result in the
filing of complaints in some cases in which repossession does not
become necessary,57 experience may well allow the creditor to
select with reasonable statistical accuracy those who will likely
continue in default.
Where the judicial backlog is substantial, obviously other
5

4Id.

530.

55 See Dauer & Gilhool, supra note 5, at 125-27; White, supra note 2, at 520. But see
Johnson, A Response, supra note 5, at 157-58. Certainly debtors who have equity in the
repossessed automobile, or who might be subject to a deficiency judgment, have an
incentive to minimize repossession costs in this way.
5' White, supra note 2, at 518.
57 Professor White argues that this factor will preclude creditors from considering
such a ploy. Id. However, this conclusion is based on Professor White's much higher
estimate of the costs of initial filing. Moreover, Professor White fails to consider that e 3
in 5 debtors who voluntarily surrender their automobiles will not necessarily wait until
the day before their hearing to do so. The time made up in such cases may serve to
balance out other delays.
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statutory solutions may be required. The legislature might also
take up the Supreme Court's invitation in Fuentes5s to create
more efficient, informal and less time-consuming systems for
redressing creditor-debtor conflicts, e.g., special consumer courts.
Such courts, relying perhaps upon lay advocates, might well
reduce the low income consumer's fear of the judicial process
and his unwillingness or inability to employ it as well. Legislative
innovation might, alternatively, allow a creditor to prove his
claim inexpensively by affidavit in the two in five cases in which
the debtor defaults. 59 Thus, given a reasonable response by
creditors, lawyers and legislators, Professor White's estimate of
the costs of judicial repossession may be greatly exaggerated.
Another basic difficulty with White's analysis is that it draws
a sharp distinction between automobiles and other consumer
goods, and yet 9-503 would be upheld with respect to all repossessions without reference to this distinction. My impression is
that in my home state of Texas at least, refrigerators, furniture,
and other household goods and appliances are often subject to
private repossession. 60 Further, I would suggest that if private
repossessions of goods other than automobiles are not common
elsewhere under the present state of the law, they may become
so as the burdens of replevin are increased by the Fuentes
decision. In these non-automobile cases, the only additional cost
is for legal fees; the opportunity costs and depreciation are

usually negligible over a thirty- or sixty-day period. Yet having
cast the balance under the due process clause in terms of the
typical automobile case, Professor White would nonetheless extend approval of private repossessions to a class of goods in
which the creditor's costs are dramatically lower. 61 I am not
suggesting that an issue of constitutional proportions arises from
the difference between automobiles and refrigerators; I do mean
58 407 U.S. at 96-97.
5' See notes 292-93 supra & accompanying text. See also Dauer & Gilhool, supra note 5,
at 125. But see Johnson, A Response, supra note 5, at 156. Fuentes does not require a
hearing in such cases, 407 U.S. at 92 n.29.
60 This is true despite the trend, under evolving notions of "breach of the peace," to
follow Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934), rather than Cherno v.
Bank of Babylon, 54 Misc. 2d 277, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114 (S. Ct. 1967), affd, 29 App. Div.
2d 767, 288 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1968). See generally White, Representing the Low Income
Consumer in Repossessions,, Resales and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 808,
810-12 (1970); Comment, Non-JudicialRepossession-Reprisalin Need of Reform, 11 B.C. IND.
& CoMm. L. REv. 435, 440-49 (1970).
6 While it might be expected that the percentage of costs to value in repossessing,

say, a color television should be higher than the percentage in an automobile, this is not
necessarily true, given the inflated prices frequently attached to such goods, particularly
by merchants who sell to high risk consumers. A new color television may well cost more
than a used car.
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to say, however, that a cost-benefit study must take into account
differences in the likelihood of repossession for different classes
of consumer goods.
There are still other factual, questions regarding costs which
are not answered and which must be answered in order to
complete an economic cost-benefit analysis. 62 Moreover, even if
substantial additional costs are imposed upon the creditor, he
may diminish those costs by more carefully screening his debtors.
To be sure, this screening may involve some costs of its own, and
it is unclear whether the costs of accurately predicting defaults
will be substantial. Possibly, however, consumers as a class, or
even poor consumers as a class, will not generally be paying
significantly higher interest rates or prices; rather, the most
marginal consumers will be eliminated from the consumer market through relatively inexpensive changes in the screening
process.6 3 In a sense there is a social cost when a discrete group
is denied the benefits of color televisions, stereos, and other
goods which they cannot afford. On the other hand, is this not
the cheapest way to deal with the problem? Court costs, depreciation, attorney's fees and the much discussed losses which a
creditor must endure in any transaction in which repossession
takes place, would all be eliminated. This assumes, of course,
that the screening process is sufficiently accurate so as not to
screen out a large group of consumers who would not default,
resulting in lost profits exceeding the savings on default avoidance.
Finally, though I have no more empirical proof than Professor White offers, it seems to me likely that breaches of warranty
and other defects in the seller's performance are much more
likely than he admits. With respect to automobiles, even the most
casual reading of consumer magazines, consultation with the
service manager at a local dealership, discussions with consumers
or common experience should make this clear. If the point is
that debtors often cannot assert such defenses against creditors
who are holders in due course, or that automobile finance
j2 For instance, if state officials are in fact required to execute on the property after
judicial repossession, is the cost of repo~session by the state less than the cost of a similar
private repossession?
63 Furthermore, to the extent that the costs of repossession are significantly increased, those costs may be most accurately distributed through the mechanism of
creditors' seeking deficiency judgments. Unfortunately the deficiency judgment process
itself is an expensive way to distribute costs. Furthermore, these costs may be indirectly
passed on to the debtor by the use of deflated resale prices in determining the amount of
the deficiency judgment. See generally Schuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of
Automobile Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REv. 20 (1969).
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contracts do not permit the right of set-off, this seems to me to
be a separate issue. Courts and legislatures are continually required to pass on and re-evaluate the question of what defenses
should be available to a debtor; the fact that they may have been
restrictive in the past is not conclusive of the desirability of a
hearing prior to the repossession of the chattel. More pragmatically, as Professor White notes, 64 a debtor who remains in possession of the goods may be in a superior bargaining position to
negotiate a reduction in price or a basis upon which to retain
possession-notwithstanding the technicalities of the code and
contract.
Notwithstanding my doubts about the costs that judicial
repossession will impose on the creditor, it may well be that
Professor White has gotten the better of the argument. It is
hardly shocking or novel to assert that some judicial process is
more expensive than none, or stated differently, that due process requirements do not create the most efficient system for
resolving creditor-debtor disputes. I assume that criminal justice
would be much swifter and less expensive if most of the procedural rights afforded criminals were abandoned. Indeed, the
only quantifiable cost would be the conviction of one or two
defendants in a hundred who would not plead or be found
guilty, a cost which would be readily outweighed by the expeditious conviction of the other ninety-eight.
The problem is not simply whether judicial repossession is
more expensive than private repossession, or even whether judicial repossession confers economic benefits on debtors as a group
equivalent to the additional costs incurred by them; the problem
is whether the inevitable additional costs are worth it in the light
of the individual rights which are protected.6 5 That is, is protecting the possessory interests of those debtors who are not in
default or who have adequate defenses worth the more than
$100 million (to strike a figure somewhat less than Professor
White's) it will require? The due process balance cannot be
drawn solely in economic terms; rather, intangible factors must
be taken into account, the most important of which is the
strength of our ethical belief, grounded in the Constitution, that
a person should not be deprived of his possessory interest in
property without notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Cost
64

White, supra note 2, at 527-28.

65 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER

FINANCE, supra note 29, at 30.
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is not irrelevant, but it must be analyzed within the broader
framework. 6
The Fuentes court was well aware of these noneconomic
considerations and was at pains to make them clear:
A prior hearing always imposes some costs in time,
effort, and expense, and it is often more efficient to
dispense with the opportunity for such a hearing. But
these rather ordinary costs cannot outweigh the constitutional right. . . . Procedural due process is not
intended to promote efficiency or accommodate all possible interests: it is intended to protect the particular
interests of the person whose possessions are about to
be taken.
. . . [T]he Constitution recognizes higher values
than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say
of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process
Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from . . .
overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy ....
Without taking the almost absolutist position of Mr. Justice
Stewart, do the costs of judicial repossession outweigh the gains?
In my view, subjective as it is, the gains in terms of trust in the
legal system, perceptions of just treatment, satisfaction of the
expectancy interests of American consumers, and monopolization of nonconsensual repossession by the state (to be discussed
below), clearly outweigh the debatable additional costs imposed
on the creditor and debtor.
Moreover, if the balance of the evidence is unclear and
unpersuasive and is likely to remain so, the burden of proof
should be placed on the party resisting the application of due
process norms.6 It has become fashionable these days, in the
words of one of my colleagues, Professor Albert Alschuler, to
rely on the "significance of statistically insignificant data" to
defeat constitutional claims. The world is complex, and the more
we study it, the less we seem to know. If the burden of persuasion is placed on the party seeking constitutional protection, if
66 It is also crucial in casting the balance here to recognize that it is a system which
may be approved, not any particular usage under the system. Thus, the court must be
content with its result should usages change or vary, that is, for example, should some
creditors find it most efficient to contact their debtors only once before repossession. Cf.
Neth, supra note 5, at 33: "There is evidence that some sellers pervert the system and
profit from default and repossession."
67 407
88

U.S. at 90 n.22 (quoting in part Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)).
But see Martin, supra note 5, at 630.
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the argument is that the debtor has not proven that the class he
represents or society will necessarily benefit by adherence to
constitutional and ethical norms, then those norms become
meaningless; the debtor will never be able to prove his case.
V.

THE PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE PRINCIPLE

Balancing economic costs and benefits is, of course, an effort
to determine what procedural process is due debtors prior to
interference with their possessory interests in property; and, at
least in theory, that question can only follow a conclusion that
the state is somehow involved in the interference. But in the
self-help repossession cases we are not concerned solely with
compelling creditors to follow particular procedures; we are also
concerned that they are exercising physical power in the stead of
the state. In this light it is significant that the functional effect of
Fuentes was to transfer from private creditors to the state the
authority to decide whether a repossession would take place
prior to final adjudication. Though the decision may be explained on the narrower ground alone, Fuentes also seems to
endorse the principle that the state should maintain control over
nonconsensual physical interference with property in the possession and control of a party whose claim to that property is
contested by another. 69 Stated somewhat differently, this prindple (which I shall call the physical interference principle) holds
that the power of the state to interfere physically with the status
quo without the consent of property owners may not be delegated in law or fact to private persons. Its justification lies in the
strong policies favoring state monopolization of coercive interference with possessory interests in property in an age of mass
consumer markets.
As distinguished from traditional fourteenth amendment
analysis, the physical interference principle would compel the
state to step in to limit private physical interference with possessory rights in property even where the state had not previously
been involved. It would clearly prohibit self-help repossession.
Thus, it would eliminate the great functional anomaly in the law
which would exist if private repossession, though the far greater
threat to possessory property rights, were distinguished from
replevin on state action grounds and upheld.
69
Cf. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub. nom. Adams v.
Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1974); Dunham, supra note 5, at
153.
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At the same time the physical interference principle is less

volatile than the state action arguments currently advanced in
the section 9-503 cases. For it would not transform every private
contractual relationship, undertaken pursuant to state law or
approved by the state judiciary, into state action governed by
strict fourteenth amendment standards of fairness and respect
for personal and property rights.70
The physical interference principle has its origins in admittedly discarded notions of the unconstitutionality of delegations
of public police powers to private citizens. But a review of the
unconstitutional delegation cases should make clear a few critical
distinctions. In a 1912 decision, Eubank v. City of Richmond,7 ' the
Supreme Court was presented with a local ordinance which
provided that the owners of two-thirds of the property on a
street could require the municipality to establish a building line
for the construction of new edifices. The Court invalidated the
ordinance under the due process clause as the conferral of a
public power on private property owners. The Court's reasoning
was not particularly persuasive; it simply stated, without much
discussion, that since there were no standards for the exercise of
the power, leaving the possibility that the controlling property
owners might act arbitrarily or out of their own selfish interests
or individual tastes, the ordinance could not be upheld as an
exercise of the power to protect the public health, safety, morals
or convenience. After what appears to be an inexplicable varia72
tion from this principle in Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago,
the Court again in Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v.
Roberge73 struck down a local ordinance which it asserted delegated public power to private citizens. In that case, the owners of
property within 400 feet of a proposed home for the aged had
the effective power to prohibit or allow that land use pursuant to
local zoning -laws. Finally, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 74 a case
involving a constitutional attack on the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act7 5 enacted during the New Deal, Justice Sutherland,
writing for a majority of the Court, fully articulated the rationale
of the unconstitutional delegation argument:
70

Cf. Dunham, supra dote 5, at 153; White, supra note 2, at 506.

71 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
72 242 U.S. 526 (1916). See F. MICHELMAN
AREAS 117-24 (1970).

& T.

SANDALOW, GOVERNMENT IN URBAN

73 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
74 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
75 Ch. 824, §§ 1-23, 49 Stat. 991, repealed, Act of Apr. 26, 1937, ch. 127, § 20(a), 50
Stat. 90.
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[The Bituminous Coal Conservation Act] delegates the
power to fix maximum hours of labor to a part of the
producers and the miners-namely, "the producers of
more than two-thirds of the annual national tonnage
production for the preceding calendar year" and "more
than one-half of the mine workers employed"; and to
producers of more than two-thirds of the district annual
tonnage during the preceding calendar year and a majority of the miners, there is delegated the power to fix
minimum wages for the district or group of districts....
The power conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling
minority. This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or
an official body, presumptively distinterested, but to
private persons whose interests may be and often are
adverse to the interests of others in the same business.
...The difference between producing coal and regulating its production is, of course, fundamental. The
former is a private activity; the latter is necessarily a
governmental function, since, in the very nature of
things, one person may not be entrusted with the power
to regulate the business of another, and especially of a
competitor. And a statute which attempts to confer such
power undertakes an intolerable and unconstitutional
interference with personal liberty and private property.
The delegation is ... clearly arbitrary, and . . . clearly a
denial of the rights safeguarded by the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment . .

..

The position articulated by Justice Sutherland was troublesome. On its face it resurrected notions of the Sovereign as
exclusive lawmaker. Grounded in substantive due process,7 7 it
evidenced a rejection of principles of representative democracy,
principles widely accepted in the society at large. Moreover, the
assertion that private lawmaking was unconstitutional seemed to
contradict the facts and practicalities of life in a modern industrial society. Moved by these concerns and others, Professor
Jaffe, in a classic article,7 8 subjected the Sutherland position to a
detailed analysis, and amassed a substantial case that that posi79
tion was fatally flawed.
76298 U.S. at 310-11.
" While the same term might be applied to the role allocation analysis presented
here,78there is in fact, a real difference. See Tribe, supra note 39, at 1, 15, 32 passim.
Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937).
"' Less broadly, Cartersimply stands for the proposition that the private majority may
not take the property of a private minority without the minority's consent. If this is the
case, Carter may be more alive than most commentators have indicated. This analysis also
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Professor Jaffe argued that private bodies often enact laws
in the sense that they seek to regulate behavior in society. Private
associations, labor unions, medical societies and other private
groups often promulgate rules w,hich are employed to regulate
their members. Contractual relationsfiips, including agreements
to allocate property, often take on the character of a private
constitution which, within limits, is publicly enforced. Jaffe's
conclusions were that private lawmaking pervades American law,
that it is not necessarily undesirable, and, indeed, that explicit
delegations as in Carter Coal may at times be preferable to tacit de
facto delegations.
Participation in lawmaking by private groups under
explicit statutory "delegation" does not stand then in
absolute contradiction to the traditional process and
conditions of law-making; it is not incompatible with the
conception of law. It exposes and brings into the open,
it institutionalizes a factor in law-making that we have,
eagerly in fact, attempted to' obscure. . . . It tends to
approach compulsion only where by reason of economic
force or special law it is linked with monopoly power or
can act upon persons of inferior economic power,
whereas the "delegation" supplies this compulsion universally. But it does not follow that the latter is necessarily more oppressive. Tolerated covert monopoliespower exercised indirectly-may be much more difficult
to attack or to ameliorate than the edicts of majorities
arrived at openly and according to the forms of law. 80
Additionally Jaffe suggested that in an age of extraordinary
demographic growth, technological change, and expanding government, the advantages of decentralization and primary
democracy-the education of good citizens and the inculcation
of a feeling of responsibility and participation in the affairs of
government-may be best promoted and utilized in the lawmaking of private groups. 8 ' Thus, in contrast to Justice Sutherland,
he applauded the delegation of lawmaking functions to the
82
private sector.
For all the reasons that Professor Jaffe marshalled, the
assumption is sound that public power to make law affecting the
suggests a distinction between Carterand repossession cases; in the repossession situation,
arguably the debtor has consented to a taking without judicial process. However, if it is
conceded that judicial scrutiny of the consent issue itself is required, the difference fades
into abstraction.
8
" Id 220-2 1.
81
82 1d. 202, 211-12, 251-53.
1 d. 253.
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conduct and behavior of others may be delegated to private
persons or bodies. This is a far cry, however, from the problem
presented in self-help repossession cases. In such cases the state
has not only permitted the parties to determine the law between
themselves by way of a contractual undertaking, it has also given
private parties the power to impose physical sanctions for the
violations of their private laws. It is one thing to allow neighbors
to make land use decisions with respect to adjoining property; it
is quite another to allow them to authorize and then carry out a
physical sanction against a landowner for his failure to abide by
their laws, e.g., to tear down a nonconforming structure, even if
that sanction might ultimately be ordered by a court. Although
the sanctioning power in cases of private repossession is limited
in scope and subject to subsequent judicial review, it is nonetheless a substantial nonconsensual interference with possessory
property rights which places the burden upon the property
owner to secure the return of his property.
The theoretical distinction between the two situations seems
clear enough. The delegation of lawmaking power to the private
persons affected is necessary in order to achieve the flexible and
efficient compromise among the conflicting policies and interests
that must go into the making of a rule of general applicability.
Such a rationale supports a delegation of the responsibility for
deciding, even to the most minute detail, under what facts
sanctions should be applied. But it does not support a delegation
to private persons of the authority to determine finally what the
facts are in a particular case, that is, whether sanctions are
authorized within the valid scope of the reigning rule. Such
authority, when it involves a sanction of physical interference
with possessory property rights, must therefore remain in the
state. By the same reasoning, the authority to carry out such
sanctions must remain in the state as well. In sum, the repudiation of the doctrine restricting the delegation of public lawmaking power to private persons is hardly a repudiation of the
notion that the government should retain a monopoly over the
process of applying physical sanctions once the law formation
process has been completed.
Moreover, where physical interference with possessory interests in property is concerned, strong policies embedded in
common notions of fair process require that the state .maintain
its monopoly of authority to permit sanctions. To illustrate this
point, it is useful to note that even administrative agencies do not
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have the power to seize or destroy property without prior judicial scrutiny, except in emergency situations such as where noxious objects must be destroyed. 3 As Professor Jaffe has noted,
When the process is the ultimate one of execution, it is
customary for the judicial action to precede execution.
. . [I]n the regulation of forbidden practices,. e.g.,
unfair labor and trade practices, it has been customary
to leave the respondent untouched, at least until the
final administrative order and-as with Labor Board
orders-even until the entry of a judicial enforcing
decree. Recent legislation . . . empowers certain agencies, of which the Labor Board is one, to seek a preliminary injunction, a device which once more attests to the
ubiquity of the judicial imprimatur before the exercise
of official force.8 4
*

This limitation on administrative agencies is not an attempt to
make control of the instrumentalities of enforcement a judicial
function (for it is an executive function in any event); rather it is
to insure that the judiciary maintains exclusive control of the
determination of the legality of the enforcement.8 5
If administrative agencies, despite their broad rulemaking
and adjudicative functions, are generally required to seek judicial approval before the imposition of sanctions which interfere
with possessory interests, the case is ever so much stronger when
private parties seek to authorize and carry out such sanctions by
private means. An administrative agency, at least in theory, is a
disinterested body seeking to maximize the public good pursuant
to its legislative mandate. Private parties, conversely, have a
direct and immediate economic stake in the sanctioning decision;
and therefore it is unrealistic to expect unbiased decisions, that
is, decisions which weigh the competing private property interests and the broader societal implications of the imposition of
sanctions. Moreover, administrative agencies are publicly accountable in a way that private decisionmakers are not; only the
occasional private lawsuit after the fact stands as a bar to abusive
private action.
These arguments for state monopolization of the sanction83 The self-help repossession case would not constitute an emergency exception. See
Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-93 (1972).
8
4Jaffe, The Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Orders, 76 HARV. L. REV. 865-66
(1963). See also Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARV. L. REv.'401, 769 (1958) (2

parts).5

See Jaffe, The Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Orders, 76 HARV. L. REV. 865,
866 (1963).
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ing process when it involves physical interference with the status
quo apply with particular force to private repossessions. Whatever the weaknesses of the judicial process, judges are much
more likely to be fair in deciding whether to repossess property.
They, unlike the creditors, do not have an economic interest in
the decision. In addition, they are required to and are accustomed to abide by procedures designed to insure fairness in the
decisionmaking process. Moreover, the typical constraints that
would operate to restrict creditor overreaching-the fear of loss
of business and goodwill-are generally not significant in any
given consumer transaction, and there is little to fear from the
disorganized consumer community by way of retaliation. Thus
inequality in bargaining power, manifested by adhesive form
contracts, is likely to allow the creditor great leeway in making
repossession decisions.
Other strong policy reasons dictate that the state must retain
its monopoly over the enforcement of sanctions which involve
physical intereference with possessory property interests. The
arguments concerning this enforcement role, like those concerning the state's authorization role, apply with particular force to
the case of self-help repossession. Of course, given Fuentes, the
state's monopoly of the enforcement role requires that it maintain the ultimate authorization role as well.
There is a general expectation that-the use of force will be
monopolized by the state; that even the state's employment of
force will be subject to stringent limitations; and that the use
of force by private persons, except in extraordinary
circumstances,8 6 is illegitimate. Indeed, the Fuentes court, in
describing proper prehearing seizures by government authority,
specified that in such cases "the State . ...
kept strict control over
its monopoly of legitimate force ...., So far as the enforcement of private rights is concerned, this expectation apparently
relies on the principle that only the disinterested state can be
depended on to employ force judiciously in promoting private
ends.
The Uniform Commercial Code, of course, forbids repossession where it will result in a breach of the peace-at a
minimum, where it will result in violence-but this restriction
seems clearly insufficient. In the first place, it limits only the kind
of force that can be applied; not all physical interference is
proscribed. Secondly, as Professor Martin had noted, the Code's
86 5ee W. PROSSER, supra note 28.
87 4 0 7

U.S. at 91.
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"restriction is less a certain guaranty that there will be no breach
of the peace than a command to the court to invalidate, after the
88
fact, a private repossession that involved breach of the peace.
Since after the fact litigation may be rare, and invalidation even
rarer, and since the costs of invalidation may be low in economic
terms, a rational creditor might well conclude that there is little
to fear from violation of the breach of the peace proviso.
Moreover, the likelihood of debtor-initiated violence is less
when the state conducts the retaking of the chattel. Often a
debtor may not realize that the person taking his property is
anything more than a thief or intruder. The repossessor does
not have the official trappings of legitimate power-police cars
and sirens and uniforms, and even if the private repossessor is
known or identified to the debtor, the debtor may very well resist
ifhe thinks the repossession is unwarranted. To be sure, as the
average police officer will attest, citizen attacks on policemen are
not unknown, but it seems less likely that a citizen would be
willing to attack an armed and trained police officer who is
clothed with the official order of a court.
A further reason for not allowing creditors to respossess
relates to protection of the increasingly respected privacy interest. Nearly all repossessions involve some interference with
the privacy interests of the debtor. Intrusion into the house is the
most obvious case. But what of opening a debtor's garage door to
89
reclaim an automobile?
Putting aside the case of calculated illegal intrusion, obviously the intrusion of a private agent is most unjust when the
repossession is unwarranted. Were a hearing required prior to
authorization of the repossession, as would be the case for'
repossession by a government official,9 " presumably the intrusion would be avoided. Even when repossession is called for,
repossession by a private agent is likely to result in a greater
affront to the debtor's privacy interest. The reason for this lies in
the private repossessor's reliance on stealth to avoid detection
for, if he is detected he must either desist or be guilty of a breach
of peace. 91 The difficulty is two-fold: first, the unwarned debtor
88 Martin, supra note 5, at 640-41.
11The legality of such entry apparently depends on whether the door was open,
locked or dosed. See White, supra note 60, at 811 n.10 (citing cases).
9'Fuentes, of course, establishes this. See also Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 272-73,
486 P.2d 1242, 1252-53, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 52-53 (1971) (prejudgment seizure of property
by county sheriff unconstitutional interference with fourth amendment privacy right
where no probable cause shown; apparently requiring showing of probable merit of
claim and probable cause to believe the chattel was in the place to be searched).
creditor's
9
1See Comment, supra note 60.
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will be unaware of his exposure and unable to take precautions
to protect his privacy; second, the repossessor may increase the
scope of his intrusion in order to avoid detection. The typical
situation is that of the debtor who awakes to find his car
missing-along with many of his personal belongings or papers
92
'which were contained in the car.
No doubt this difficulty of preserving debtor privacy in the
face of private intrusions to repossess is one element of the
general expectation that only the state can legitimately enforce
nonconsensual changes in the status quo of possessory property
interests. Significantly, the difficulties in both the violence and
privacy contexts result not only from conscious misconduct by
repossessors; they occur accidentally and unavoidably as well
(e.g., creditor initiated violence; taking the papers inside the
repossessed car). Even if it could deter intentional misconduct,
after-the-fact litigation is no more protection in such cases than
was the prospect of damage recoveries for the plaintiffs in
Fuentes.93 The only certain remedy is monopolization of enforcement by the state.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The interest of the creditor in private repossession, unhindered by the requirements of notice and hearing prior to the
seizure of property, is substantial. There are additional costs
imposed by judicial repossession, and creditors may well feel that
they have lost their most precious contractual right-the right to
preserve their investments without resorting to the complexities
imposed by judges and lawyers. 9 4 But the toll taken by allowing
private repossession is also high; indeed it is greater. The likelihood that debtors who are not in default or who have valid
defenses will lose their property is significant; for the creditors,
possessed of a vital economic stake in the decision to seize and
unconstrained by market forces, may.well be indifferent to the
merits of the debtor's position. Most importantly, private repossession sharply undercuts the shared expectation that the
debtor's possessory interest in his property may not be infringed
2
" See, e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 327 n.4 (9th Cir.
1974). The creditor may be liable for conversion of personal property inside the car
in such a case, however. See Sanders v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 180 S.C. 138,
185 S.E. 180 (1936).
9' See 407 U.S. at 81-82.
94 Creditors apparently feel that the right to take a security interest and to repossess
upon default is their single most important remedy. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 29, at 29-30.
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without his consent or without judicial intervention. Judicial
control of the decision to impose the repossession sanction and
executive control of the sanction itself are vital to the preservation of society's and the individual's interest in privacy, fairness
and nonviolence. The delegation of such power to private persons in our society, under evolving standards of due process, is
simply too antithetical to these and other ethical norms to be
permitted.

